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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this master thesis is to answer whether a Developed Country firm 
would generate higher returns to its shareholders by acquiring a company from the US 
or by acquiring an Emerging Market target.  
 
It includes an extensive literature review that covers the main motives and theories 
behind M&As. Also, the cross border M&A theory and the rationale behind the 
internationalization and location decisions are discussed. Furthermore, an analysis of 
empirical studies in US Domestic M&A, cross border M&A and M&A in Emerging 
Markets is presented.  
 
An event study methodology is used to test the thesis’ hypothesis. A total of 517 
M&A deals from 2010 to 2012 were analyzed and a sample of 195 deals was used. A 
mean adjusted returns model is to estimate normal returns and two significance tests 
are carried out to test the statistical significance of the results.  
 
Our results showed non statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal returns 
of acquirer companies in the whole sample. Furthermore, the M&A deals with 
Emerging Markets Targets showed lower cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) for the acquiring firms in comparison to the M&A deals with US targets. 
Using an event window of 11 days, the estimated CAARs for the M&A deals with US 
targets is -0.98%, while the CAARs for the M&A deals with Emerging Market targets 
is -2.06%. In the largest event window (51 days) the CAARs for the former sample is 
estimated to be -3.57% while, for the latter sample, is estimated at -9.6%. 
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I Introduction 
 
The occurrence and scale for global mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have 
meaningfully increased during the past twenty years (Figure 1 Behavior of mergers 
and acquisitions transactions from the past 12 years according to the Institute of 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances 2013.Figure 1) in spite of continuous studies on 
their high failure rates. However the development in M&A interest, the quantity of 
capital involved, and the acceptance of M&As stand in contrast to their high degree of 
risk (Weber & Yedida, 2012).  Mergers and acquisitions are of vital significance to all 
the participants in the merging organizations without caring if they are shareholders, 
employees, costumers or part of the society. (Mendoza, 2012). Consequently, the 
achievement of these mergers and acquisitions is vital and can be completed in 
several ways. 
There are several studies that measure the reaction before and after an M&A, they 
describe the effects of the deal’s announcement on the target and the acquirer. In most 
cases, market based studies show that the target company shareholders benefit while 
the acquirer shareholders’ value is decreased (Akinbuli & Kelilume, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Behavior of mergers and acquisitions transactions from the past 12 
years according to the Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances 2013. 
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Linking two firms is a multifaceted and difficult operation because it includes every 
aspect of both corporations (Akinbuli & Kelilume, 2013).  For example, managers 
must approve on how the merger will be funded and how will the power be reassigned 
and distributed. Also the businesses must discuss the layoffs, transfers, modifications 
in job titles and job obligations etc. In this background various investigators highpoint 
such as "liability of foreignness" and "double-layered acculturation" (Aybar & Ficici, 
2009) 
The U.S. is the biggest inbound and outbound endpoint for cross-border M&A, as 
measured by volume by Morgan and Chase company (2008). Furthermore, the 
volume of cross-border acquisitions has been growing worldwide, from 23% of total 
merger volume in 1998 to 45% in 2007 (Weisebach & Erel, 2012). Theoretically, 
cross-border mergers happen for the same causes as domestic ones: two organizations 
will unify when their combination upsurges value (or utility) from the insight of the 
obtaining company's directors. Cross-border acquisitions are a track of reorganizing 
industry and an open door to a new and sometimes unexploited foreign market. It 
should be expected that cross-border operations bring a higher performance, superior 
knowledge-based assets and competitive ownership advantages that allows them to 
compete in host countries (Bertranda & Zitounab, 2008).   
 
M&As involving targets in developed and developing countries have now become a 
key constituent of foreign direct investment.  In the past two decades, M&As among 
developed and developing countries were commenced almost solely by corporations 
in developed nations. While these transactions still have a higher global share, 
emerging markets have been on the race in recent years. Countries including Mexico, 
China, Russia, Malaysia, and South Africa are taking the dominance in companies in 
developed economies at surprising rates. 
 
In 2011, of the 2,585 main acquisitions among developing and developed countries, 
20 percent of them were started by firms in emerging economies. Acquirers from 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico (BRICM) countries became materially more 
important, accumulating from 0.3% to 1.7% of all cross border M&A. Though 
9BRICM firms haveclearly becomemoreassertiveacquirers,they remainto be more
apt to be targets(3.0% of total M&A) thanacquirers(1.7% of all M&A). (Morgan
andChaseCo.,2008)
Note:Figuresmaynot resolvedueto rounding.
One of the reasonsdevelopedcountry companiesundergo M&A in emerging
economiesis explainedby the market entry hypothesis,which statesthat foreign
acquirerstargetEmergingMarket firms in orderto gainstrategicaccessto Emerging
Markets.Hence,while domesticacquirersfrom EmergingMarketsoften take over
mismanagedandpoorly performing companies,acquirersfrom DevelopedCountries
takeoverwell establishedandgoodperformingfirms in emergingmarkets.(Zhu,Jog,
& Otchere,2011). Furthermore,the differencesbetweendevelopedand emerging
markets,suchas the culture, languageand the political and legal systemsmake it
Figure 2. Developing countries BRIC and USA comparison between2001 and
2007.% of total targets and total acquirers that actedasbuyers in cross-border
M&A transaction. Source:Dealogic;A.T. Kearney Analysis,2012
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difficult for foreign companies to embark on Greenfield investments and they opt for 
an M&A alternative.  (Zaheer, 1995).  
 
However, Geographical, political, economical or cultural differences can raise the 
costs of merging two organizations. But also, deficient incorporation of worldwide 
markets within nations can lead to an acquisition in which a higher valued acquirer 
buys a fairly low-cost target following changes in exchange rates or stock market 
valuations in local currency (Erel, 2012).  
 
However, regardless if the target company is located in an emerging economy or a 
developed country, what is most important for the investors is the value generated 
from their acquisition. One of the methods for measuring the achievement of the 
acquisition is by concentrating on the shareholder returns before and after the 
announcement date; as shareholders are the regulatory authority in the company and 
the proprietors of the firm. Thus, focusing on the shareholder value yields an efficient 
evaluation criterion (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). 
 
. 
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II Literature Review 
 
This segment commences by studying the theoretical and empirical lessons of the 
reasons for mergers and acquisitions and then debates the theoretical and empirical 
consequences of returns to stakeholders in Domestic, Cross-Border and Emerging 
Markets mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Motives for M&A 
 
There have been extensive studies that provide possible explanations as to why a 
company would decide to participate in an M&A. The most mentioned motive is to 
create value through synergy. However there are many other reasons such as 
incorporating new technologies, expanding to new markets or even management self-
interest, among others. (Vazirani, 2012)  
 
Berkovitch & Narayanan conclude that there are three major motives for M&A: The 
synergy motive, the agency motive and hubris. (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).  Am 
It, Livnat et al, (1989) affirm that, from the target’s perspective, M&A’s main reason 
is to reduce managerial inefficiencies that prevent free cash flows from being 
distributed to the firm’s owners. (Am It, Livnat, & Paul, 1989). Ismail Ahmad (2011) 
proposes misvaluation as a motive for M&A. He concludes that overvalued acquirers 
seek to buy less overvalued targets and pay with stock hence benefiting their long-
term shareholders. (Ahmad, 2011). Another motive for firms to acquire other 
companies is to reduce uncertainty by minimizing critical dependencies. These 
dependencies can be symbiotic, which derive from vertical relationships (i.e. 
suppliers) or competitive interdependence, when two firms depend on the same 
resources. (Pfeffer, 1972).  
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The managerialism theory sustains that managers perform M&A with the objective of 
maximizing their own utility, even if it is at the expense of the company’s 
shareholders. (Seth, Song, & Pettit , 2000). The hubris hypothesis proposes that 
managers make mistakes in evaluating targets and possible synergies, but they go 
through the acquisitions assuming their valuations are correct. (Seth, Song, & Pettit , 
2000). These motives result in value destruction for the acquiring firm when the 
merger is announced. (Ahmad, 2011) 
 
Alternatively, Finkelstein, Cary & Sydney reject that creating greater value for 
acquiring shareholders, hubris and agency are the only valid motives for M&A. They 
argue that the reason that most M&A deals are considered as failures is because those 
motives fall short when explaining the real objectives behind M&A. They propose 4 
motivation categories: exploitation (which includes the synergies), exploration, stasis 
and survival. They recognize reasons such as: assembling a long term industry 
position, exploring new potential markets, acquiring technologies and ideas for future 
growth, political favors, preventing competitors from presenting a threat in the future, 
size as defense against takeovers and preserving or maintaining customer and supplier 
relations, among others. (Finkelstein, Cary, & Sydney, 2007). Anslinger, et al. explain 
that companies can pursue a no synergistic strategy for M&A and still get profitable 
results.  (Anslinger & Copeland, 1996).  
 
Although these motives seem valid, there is not enough empirical evidence that 
supports that they are more relevant than the three most cited theories in the literature: 
synergies, hubris and agency. The synergy hypothesis, along with the empirical 
evidence that supports it, is further discussed below. 
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The Synergy Hypothesis 
 
“Synergy is a word derived from the Greek word synergos, which means “working 
together” (Campbell and Goold, 1998). The Synergy Hypothesis states that 
acquisitions occur when the value of the combined firm is greater than the sum of the 
value of the individual companies. (Seth, Song, & Pettit , 2000) Hence, there is an 
economic gain as a result of the acquisition. This value creation comes from a variety 
of sources that can be divided in three categories: Financial, Economical or 
Operational and Strategic. (Finkelstein, Cary, & Sydney, 2007). 
 
Financial Synergies are created as a result of any alteration to a firm’s capital 
structure that come from acquiring or merging with another company (Lewellen, 
1971). In a perfect capital market there are no bankruptcy costs, taxes, information 
asymmetry, or agency costs. Hence, the capital structure is irrelevant to the firm value. 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958) However, in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, 
capital structure is very important. Financial synergies benefit shareholders by 
reducing the firm’s cost of capital (Trautwein, 1990). The sources of these synergies 
are: tax benefits, taking advantage of undervalued targets, exploiting unused debt 
capacity, target’s excess cash, diversification and minimizing risk, among others. 
Lewellen (1971) stated that financial synergies are always positive. However, Leland 
(2007) argues that when firms have significantly different risks and default costs a 
merger would create negative financial synergies. (Leland, 2007) 
 
Economical or Operational synergies represent the gains that come from merging the 
operations of two separate firms into one company. Economies of scale, economies of 
scope and increase market power are some of the most important sources of this type 
of synergy. Economies of scale can be exploited by spreading fixed operations costs 
over more products or units. This includes several functional areas of a company 
including production, R&D, administration and distribution. Also, an increase in 
output can also boost efficiency.  
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Economies of scope are realized when the operations costs of multiple products are 
reduced by having one company undertake the production and distribution functions 
of two separate firms. Economies of scale and scope increase shareholder value by 
reducing operative and administrative costs. Huyghebaert & Luypert (2013) found 
that acquirers often succeed in realizing cost based synergies during the first year of 
the acquisition. However the acquirers are much more effective in reducing “other 
operating costs” such as advertising expenditures and office supplies than “cost of 
goods sold”. (Huyghebaert & Luypaert, 2013).  However, according to Chatterjee 
(1986), out of the three kinds of synergy, the economic or operational is associated 
with the lowest value. (Chatterjee, 1986) 
 
Strategic synergy sources include overcapacity reductions, vertical integration, 
product or market extension and acquiring knowledge, capabilities and resources. 
Overcapacity reductions imply closing down the least competitive target’s facilities, 
letting go of their less effective managers and rationalizing administrative processes. 
The acquisition would result in a greater market share for the acquirer and most 
importantly, a more efficient and more profitable operation system (Bower, 2001). In 
his study, Bower (2001) concluded that from 1997 to 1999 around 37% of 
acquisitions were driven by the strategic objective of reducing overcapacity.   
 
Vertical integration is often a motive for mergers and acquisitions, since it reduces 
inventory costs, accelerates the supply chain and improves market access. (Gold & 
Campbell, 1998). One of the most important strategic motives for M&A is to extend a 
firm’s product line or its international reach (Bower, 2001). Some benefits of 
acquiring companies for this purpose include a stronger brand name, an expanded 
marketing and distribution capability and the exploitation of existing customer 
relationships. (Inkpen, Sundaram, & Rockwood, 2000).  
 
Acquiring “know-how” is another important source of strategic synergies.  When a 
company does not have the resources to develop or improve a product that will help it 
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stay competitive, a viable solution is to acquire a target that does. Some companies 
like Microsoft and Cisco have been continuously successful at substituting R&D with 
M&A. (Bower, 2001). Chatterjee (1986) found that between the financial, economical 
or operational and strategic sources of synergies mentioned above, the strategic 
synergy sources are associated with the highest value.  
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Cross Border M&A are also driven by efficiency increase intentions. The main 
categories of efficiency gains are usually: Production rationalization, Economies of 
scale and scope and Technological progress. Rationalization improvements might be 
above significant for cross-border operations. Merging partners are more tending to 
diverge in their borderline manufacturing costs when they are originally positioned in 
separate nations, because of country inequalities in relation of capital and 
employment endowment, jurisdictional and official environment, etc. Also, they may 
take advantage from savings in business expenditures and a superior marketplace 
entry abroad (Bertranda & Zitounab, 2008).  
 
However, to obtain some efficiency gains, companies are in the need to disperse their 
manufacture activities geographically within countries while sacrificing some 
economies of scale. Indeed, the removal of repeated undividable tasks is very 
important, since firms look more alike. Also, M&A permit merging firms to obtain 
benefit of input purchasing economies (Shleifer & Summers, 1988). They came to the 
idea that the wages paid by firms are lower when they merge internationally, rather 
than nationally: instinctively, merging companies are capable to threat unions to 
change fabrication from domestic to foreign plants, building then domestic and 
extraterritorial unions contend on salaries (Salant & Switzer, 1983).  
 
To some extent, technological implications wins stronger efficiency gains from cross-
border M&A. Integration in partnership is more likely to disagree in positions of 
technological features when being situated in different technological atmosphere, 
snowballing assets and generating a higher one-way or two-way dissemination of 
know-how within the firm. The similar style of argument can be prolonged to 
decision-making and administrative knowledge since M&A distinguish a means of 
shifting the most effective practices of a company (Arnold & Smarzynska, 2005). 
 
 17 
Nevertheless, organizational difficulties may stop merging firms from accomplishing 
efficiency increases. The obligatory organizational modifications are more 
challenging to implement for cross-border M&A since there is a higher gap in nations 
and/or business culture. Furthermore, the market for company regulator is 
characterized by a high asymmetry in information (Gioia and Thomsen, 2004). 
Conclusively, purchaser and target firms might not profit similarly from M&A gains 
if there is one-sided resource redistribution from target firms to purchasers, or the 
other way round. Firms gain a priori more with bilateral resource redeployments.  
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Motives for Cross Border M&A in Emerging Markets 
 
According to Atsmon et al, by 2025 the annual consumption in emerging markets will 
be around $30 Trillion. Furthermore, Emerging Markets will contribute more than 
70% of the global GDP growth from 2012 to 2025. These markets represent the 
biggest growth opportunity in the history of capitalism. (Atsmon, Child, Dobbs, & 
Narasimhan, 2012).  
 
Zhu, et al. (2011) found that acquisitions in emerging markets undertaken by foreign 
acquirers are explained by the market entry hypotheses. This hypothesis suggests that 
cross border acquirers use acquisitions as a way to access emerging markets. (Zhu, 
Jog, & Otchere, 2011). The differences between developed and emerging markets, 
such as the culture, language and the political and legal systems make it difficult for 
foreign companies to embark on Greenfield investments (Zaheer, 1995). Hence, while 
domestic acquirers from emerging markets often take over mismanaged and poorly 
performing companies, acquirers from developed countries take over well established 
and good performing firms in emerging markets. (Zhu, Jog, & Otchere, 2011).  
 
Ozkan (2011) analyzed the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on the 
acquirer’s CEO compensation packages using a sample of UK companies from 1999 
to 2005. He found that CEOs receive larger compensations following foreign 
acquisitions, hence, CEOs have strong incentives to perform foreign acquisitions. 
(Ozkan, 2012) 
 
The synergy hypothesis explained above also applies in acquisitions performed in 
emerging markets. Chari, et al. found that emerging markets offer an important 
opportunity to generate higher returns to foreign firms. They propose that acquirers 
can improve the target’s value by implementing their more developed institutional 
and corporate governance practices, including legal and accounting standards. Also, 
emerging markets lack strong contracting institutions which makes it hard to write 
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enforceable contracts. This represents an opportunity for developed market acquirers 
to overcome this weak institutional environment and increase the target’s value.  
(Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2010).  
 
Cross Border M&A: Theory, proprietorship, location and 
internationalization. 
 
 
Theory 
 
The volume of cross-border acquisitions has been growing worldwide, from 23% of 
total merger volume in 1998 to 45% in 2007 (Weisebach & Erel, 2012). Theoretically, 
cross-border mergers happen for the same causes as domestic ones: two organizations 
will unify when their combination upsurges value (or utility) from the insight of the 
obtaining company's directors. Cross-border acquisitions are a track of reorganizing 
industry and an open door to a new and sometimes unexploited foreign market. It 
should be expected that cross-border operations bring a higher performance, superior 
knowledge-based assets and competitive ownership advantages that allows them to 
compete in host countries (Bertranda & Zitounab, 2008).   
 
From another point of view, it is well known from the business corporation mindset, 
that M&A could produce unilateral anticompetitive results; and/or organized effects 
by smoothing complicity among challenging firms (Dunning, 1977). The studies 
introduced by Salant et al. (1983) highlight the boundaries of M&A strategies when 
they are simply driven by a greater market share. Some results of cross-border M&A 
could differ from those of domestic operations. Anti competition effects are possibly 
bigger for domestic M&A as there is additional direct competition between merging 
firms (Levy & Reitzes).  
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Geographic closeness eliminates some obstacles to trade such as transport costs or 
custom duties. It supports competition and thus, the motivations to merge for anti-
competition reasons: all equal, two companies placed in the same nation compete 
more than two companies established on independent geographical markets. However, 
differing from local transactions, cross-border M&A could simplify collusive pricing 
behavior across markets by increasing multi-market contacts among firms (Bernheim 
& Whinston, 1990). 
 
Proprietorship decision 
 
The proprietorship decision conditions that the purchasing company should have 
some competitive advantages in its local market in a way that can be used and 
transmitted to foreign subsidiaries. These must be firm specific and not 
straightforwardly imitative by other companies so as to allow the business to generate 
value throughout the foreign production decision. Also, these proprietary or 
ownership advantages are generally costly to produce in the domestic market, while 
having low costs if transferred to overseas destinations (Ayoush, 2011).  
 
Location decision 
 
The location decision tells whether or not the company is interested in a 
extraterritorial setting that is superior to the location in the company's home-based 
location and best meet the placement of its proprietorship resources. If so, the 
company must be competent to gain usage of the characteristics of the foreign market 
that will permit it to exploit and make the most of its competitive advantages in that 
market (Ayoush, 2011). 
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Internationalization decision 
 
Under the internalization decision, the company should take into consideration 
whether or not it can preserve its competitive attractiveness under the international 
acquirement or through complementary methods such as licensing or strategic growth 
(Friedman, 2002). They should be aware that most of the successful mergers and 
acquisitions have an excellent control on timing and the power to increase 
exponentially in a relatively small period of time.  
 
There are a lot of risks as well as opportunities complemented with cross-border 
M&As which may disturb their performance in contrast with domestic ones. 
Therefore, there are models and explanations why acquirers involved in cross-border 
M&As are projected to underachieve or over perform their local adversaries. 
 
One of the obstacles that may damage the outcome of an M&A deal and cause foreign 
acquisitions to fail is mentioned by Finkelstein (2007) who shows a theory of bigger 
employee confrontation in cross-border transactions. In her point of view, the factor 
for the underperformance is that the workers respond baldy to changes. Therefore, 
since the managerial style as well as the modification of the career opportunities or 
reward structures is much more unlike between corporations from different nations 
than in corporations from the same nation, transnational acquirers are predictable to 
underperform their domestic rivals. (Finkelstein, Cary, & Sydney, 2007) 
 
Another obstacle why underperformance is probable in international acquisitions in 
contrast with domestic acquisitions starts from the difficulty of Information 
Asymmetry. This asymmetry and deficiency of information in cross-border 
transactions may origin transnational acquirers to overestimate the aims and be more 
prone to overbid. So, once the acquisition, the transnational buyers may confront 
bigger obstacles in incorporating the target than domestic buyers (Gioia & Thomsen, 
2004) which might produce underperformance.  
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Independent from the problems that can arise internally, we can also mention 
problems that are inherent from the cross border location itself. Some examples are: 
• High cost of obtaining firms, often at a premium price. 
• Legal and bookkeeping expense during the transition process 
• The possible liabilities of the obtained firm 
• The trouble in merging the philosophies, background and personnel of two 
different companies 
 
Instead, there are other investigators who mention some motives why international 
buyers are expected to outperform their local competitors. For instance, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) presented that purchase of overseas assets provided the buyer’s 
firm with singular opportunities than those ascending from inland transactions, such 
as risk management, knowledge expansions and, occasionally, superior management 
strategies. Also, cross-border procurements give the chance for the businesses to 
contact different markets. This will deliver the collective firm with a growth in the 
economies of scale; since the combined production and increased sales will enable 
them to make cuts in the unit cost (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Consequently, cross-
border purchases are predicted to prove greater in characteristic industrial businesses 
where scale is a key to triumph. 
 
Sutton and Steigner also examine the impact of national culture on internalization 
benefits in cross- border M&As.  This theory is based on the work of Hymer (1960, 
1976), Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985), and Rugman (1989, 1991), among others.  
They claim that the value of internalizing intangible assets may grow if cultural 
differences create high transaction costs. Their results showed that greater cultural 
distance has a positive encouragement on the long run functioning of buyers with high 
intangibles, implying that internalization benefits from technological know-how are 
realized when cultural distance is greater between both companies. In order to obtain 
those conclusions, they made a sample that consisted of 460 U.S. bidder companies 
that acquire non- U.S. target firms between 1987 and 2004. Their examination of 
post-merger operating performance showed that buyers with big levels of intangible 
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assets in the form of scientific know-how meaningfully profit from internalization in 
countries with abundant cultural differences. High levels of intangibles only do not 
seem to lead to optimistic internalization remunerations, but the grouping of high 
levels of intangibles with high cultural distance is imperative in understanding 
internalization advantages (Steigner & Sutton, 2011).  
 
Moreover, Bertrand and Zitoun (2005) proposed a theory that states that international 
acquirements permit buyers to transfer their technological and decision-making 
capabilities to the home of the new company, which will outcome in refining the new 
company’s performance. This as an outcome predicts that international transactions 
will outperform domestic ones. 
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Review Empirical Studies 
 
Time periods 
 
Extensive empirical reports have been done to observe the issue of the returns to 
shareholders in M&As. These reports have been directed either for the short-term or 
the long-term. In the short-term studies, the time length under inspection involves 
weeks or months after the formalization of the merger and acquisition transaction, 
whereas in the long-term studies the academics prolong their inspection time length to 
involve several years after the announcement date. 
 
Short term and long-term studies have each shown individually that there are 
advantages and disadvantages. Most of the studies include under their assumptions 
that the stock market is efficient, meaning that the behavior of the stock market after 
the notice of the M&A provides a reliable measurement of the merger expected value. 
At the same time, this provides the market efficient information. This will then push 
the market, in a short time frame, to recognize the pros and cons of the acquisition 
and translate it to a change  on the share price at the moment of the merger 
(Sudarsanam S. , 2010). 
 
Short period 
 
Short period of time frame may not reflect the real impact of the merger. They 
suggest that in order to state a real opinion, the time length should be of several years 
after the announcement, in order to analyze the whole effect. Their main argument is 
that the investors need time to valuate if the decision was right, and not be clouded by 
the initial expectations. Valuate the implications of the merger and how the 
competitors react over it is essential to make a better examination (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 
2007). In most cases, when the returns are examine over short time periods around the 
declaration day of the merger, most of the reports have shown important positive 
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capital earnings for the target company shareholders due to the premium paid for their 
shares. 
 
Long period 
 
Even though the long period can have the time to analyze what the short period don’t 
it carries with it other bigger problems. As for example, the growth in possibilities for 
the existence of changes in other operational or financial actions for the buyer 
companies in the longer event windows, which can change the valuation of the 
merger, because it’s almost impossible to isolate the takeover consequences from 
those produced by other changes. Nevertheless the long period decreases the 
reliability of the test outcomes and increases the bad model problem (Tuch & 
O’Sullivan, 2007). 
 
In comparison with the short period, studies lead over long periods after the 
acquisition have shown mixed results dependent on the kind of procedure employed; 
but in most cases returns to acquirers shareholders are often significantly negative 
(Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2007). 
 
Effects of mergers and acquisition 
 
There are three common effects when it comes to a merger and acquisition: 
• Financial performance 
• Industry and aggregate concentration levels 
• Social welfare 
 
The financial performance of the firm would absolutely be disturbed by the business 
combination, as a consequence of interactions or interference that may either rise or 
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diminish the company's operating performance. Instead, the combination of two or 
more firms would decline the amount of companies in a particular industry; that as a 
result of the variations in financial performance and aggregate concentration levels. 
Merger and acquisition would also touch the social welfare of the communities. For 
instance, bringing more banks to a developing country would increase the number of 
people that would tend to place their money in different investing instruments. 
 
Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions in the US 
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2007) concluded that US studies showed an irrefutable 
conclusion were the target companies owners obtained statistical high wealth gains; 
while the results on the bidders wealth gain at the time of the acquisition showed zero, 
small gains or negative returns (Goergen & Renneboog, 2007). At the same time, 
Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007), analyzed a time period from 1950 to 2007 and 
demonstrated that the transactions with higher positive returns where US companies 
who conducted the takeover between 1950 and 1960, while from 1980 to 2005, the 
results displayed little or negative performance in most cases, in contrast with other 
nations being more positive. 
 
Short time frame analyses, which are guided for the United States, exhibit that target 
companies owners realize important benefits. While, the outcome for the bidder 
companies owners show either no significant difference in the returns to acquirers, 
small positive or negative significant returns around the announcement of the bid 
(Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). In the long-term time frames most of the investigations 
worked by the Unites States bidders find negative significant or insignificant returns, 
particularly those directed for public targets. 
 
Fuller et al. (2002) inspected the short time frame investor returns for a model of 540 
US public acquirers who gained six , seven or more local targets inside a 3 year time 
frame between 1990 and 2000. They studied the five-day event phase nearby the 
declaration day operating the market-adjusted model. Their analysis measured public, 
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private and subsidiary target companies, relation size and the scheme of payment. The 
outcomes for each of the bids are statistically significant positive CARs of 1.70%. 
More exactly, the effects show that bidders who purchase private companies got gains 
with important positive returns of 2.07%, increase when the firm is a subsidiary of a 
public company with noteworthy progressive returns of 2.75%, while they fail when 
the bidder buys a public company experiencing important negative returns of -1%. 
Also, the outcomes illustrate that when the buyer uses stock as a compensation 
scheme or when the target is big relative to the buyer, the gain or loss for the buyer 
companies is superior in absolute value. 
 
Moeller et al., (2004) studied a complete sample of 12,000 national acquirements 
completed by US public buyers among 1980 and 2001, having in mind the size effect. 
In the short time frame they employed the market model to compute the 3 day 
cumulative abnormal returns and in the long time frame the Fama-French 3 factor was 
employed over the 36 months stage. The outcomes demonstrate positive significant 
cumulative abnormal returns of 1.102% throughout the 3 days time frame period, 
although in the long term the fallouts display unimportant positive returns between 
1.1% and 2.05%. Though, their outcomes display that the declaration of acquiring 
small firms is meaningfully superior than big companies with abnormal returns 
2.24 % greater than that associated with acquisition announcements for big companies. 
 
The consequences for the long-term post mergers performance of acquirers are 
diverse and not convincing because of the sensitivity of the owner capital 
performance over the long- term time frame to the benchmark model used for 
analyzing the long-term abnormal returns, which represents a complex 
methodological problem. Though, the common of the former reports demonstrate 
wealth losses for the buyers at the time of the bid declaration and also in between the 
post-acquisitions period (Sudarsanam S. , 2010). 
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Emerging Markets M&A
Cross-bordermergersand acquisitions,including thosein emergingcountries,have
now becomea major componentof foreign direct investment(Zhu & V, 2012). It is
well known that the most divergent characteristicof emergingmarkets is higher
instability of stockprices.It is alsoknown in what is calledasthe “emergingmarket
risk premium”(Barryetal. 1997;Claessenset al. 1995).
According to Zhu (2012), the explanationfor this greaterrisk rangeis presentedin
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Weak legal enforcement, bad corporate governance system, asset stripping and 
political risk are only sub divisions of a country’s weak institutions. Because most of 
the developing countries where once a colony or part of an empire, and have recently 
obtain their independence, institutional implementation is far still from being efficient 
compared with developed countries.  
 
Some of the causes mentioned before can be amended by foreign firms, making 
companies increase their value over other local firms. As for instance cross-border 
partial purchases can expand the transnational shareholder base of the buying 
company and reduce the concentrated local shareholder proprietorship in emerging 
country firms. The developing globally diverse investor base is less likely to 
experience concurrent, symmetric, and important economic shocks and therefore may 
be superior to manage risks (Pazarbasioglu & Goswami, 2007). 
 
There are studies where cross-border acquisitions can be a successful technique to 
transfer corporate governance systems to target companies. Specifically, Bris and 
Cabolis (2008) debate that, by international law, the nationality of the target company 
modifies when 100 percent of it is obtained by a foreign company. The nationality 
change denotes that the target company must accept the legal and investor right 
fortification structure of the buying country.   
 
For partial acquisitions, Bris and Cabolis (2008) also propose that the target 
companies may freely negotiate a reserved agreement with the acquiring company to 
implement superior bookkeeping standards, disclosure practices, and authority 
configurations of the acquiring company. Besides, the target companies have the 
incentive to increase their governance system because the clearer stockholder security 
and accounting standards in the acquirer’s country results in a better merger premium 
and higher industry value (Bris & Cabolis, 2008) 
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In this context, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) show that the acquisition 
announcement returns are positively correlated with the governance transfer effect 
from the acquiring firms to the target firms (Martunova & Renneboog, 2008). 
However, this study predominately examine the governance transfer effect on firm 
evaluation and show that target firms’ shareholders benefit from better corporate 
governance in the acquiring firms, but this study does not examine the impact of 
corporate governance transfer on target firms’ risk.  
 
Cross Border vs Domestic M&A 
 
Some hypotheses suppose higher profits and returns in international transactions in 
relationship with local ones, while others demonstrate different conclusions, which 
are the outperformance of domestic acquirers over international acquirers. 
Nevertheless, confirmation till now on whether cross border deals have a relatively 
more positive, or negative, effect on bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), in 
comparison to domestic acquisitions is still discussed, contingent on the country of 
the buyer and the time period covered in the previous studies (Ayoush, 2011). 
 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) inspected the stock behavior for a sample of the 
United States acquirers associated in domestic and cross-border acquisitions between 
the years 1985 and 1995. They used the market-adjusted returns model for the (-1, +1) 
event window nearby the proclamation day. For the cross-border model the CARs 
were  (0.307%) while for the local model the returns were 1.173%.  Thus, they 
concluded US buyers in cross- border dealings had inferior returns than buyers in 
local transactions. 
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US M&As trend 
 
The U.S. is the biggest inbound and outbound endpoint for cross-border M&A, as 
measured by volume by Morgan and Chase company (2008). The trends for U.S. 
inbound vs. outbound dealings are totally dissimilar. From 2001 to 2007, the share of 
U.S. inbound M&A as a percentage of total cross border M&A increased from 6.3% 
to 7.6%, whereas U.S. companies share of outbound cross-border M&A declined 
from 7.4% to 5.3%”. (Morgan and Chase Co., 2008) 
 
Acquirers from Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico (BRICM) countries became 
materially more important, accumulating from 0.3% to 1.7% of all cross border M&A 
(Table 1). Though BRICM firms have clearly become more assertive acquirers, they 
remain to be more apt to be targets (3.0% of total M&A) than acquirers (1.7% of all 
M&A).  (Morgan and Chase Co., 2008) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 2007 2001 2007
U.S.A 6.30% 7.60% 7.40% 5.30%
BRICM 2.10% 3.00% 0.30% 1.70%
% of total targets % of total targets
Cross-Border M&A involving BRICM firms on the rise
Note: Figures represen a percentage of total cross-border M&A activity
Source: Dealogic as of Jan 7, 2008 & JP Morgan
Table 1. Compariosn between 2001 and 2007 M&A deals 
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III Development of hypothesis 
 
The main question this study aims to answer is whether a developed country firm 
would generate higher returns to its shareholders by acquiring a company from the US 
or by acquiring an Emerging Market target. 
 
On one hand, a developed country firm could face less difficulties when acquiring a 
company from a developed country and hence could realize higher profits. Cultural 
differences would be less accentuated, companies from developed countries are more 
transparent and the acquiring firms have more access to information. Emerging 
markets face higher political, social and legal risks which can ultimately hurt a 
company that is not used to handling these situations. Local Emerging Market 
competitors have a better understanding of the market and the systematic risks 
involved. If these factors, and or others, are relevant, we could expect that the returns 
generated from the announcement of a US firm acquisition are higher than those 
generated by the announcement of an Emerging Market company acquisition 
 
On the other hand, the Emerging Markets represent the biggest growth opportunity in 
the history of capitalism (Atsmon, Child, Dobbs, & Narasimhan, 2012) these growth 
opportunities can be transformed in increased acquirer shareholder returns. 
Furthermore, developed country acquirers can improve an Emerging Market target’s 
value by implementing their more developed institutional and corporate governance 
practices. Hence, if developed country acquirers can generate higher synergies when 
acquiring a target from an Emerging Market rather than a US target, we could expect 
the acquirer returns of developed companies to be higher when announcing the 
acquisition of an Emerging Market target in comparison to the returns generated by 
the announcement of the acquisition of a US target.  
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Hypothesis statement: 
Developed Country acquirers generate higher returns to their shareholders when 
announcing the acquisition of a US firm target than when they announce the 
acquisition of an Emerging Target company. 
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IV Data sample 
 
Sample Selection 
 
This thesis examines a sample of developed world acquirer firms that underwent 
mergers and acquisitions with targets from developed countries and emerging markets, 
from 2010 to 2012. 
The information about the companies involved in M&A was retrieved manually from 
ACG’s official monthly magazine “Mergers & Acquisitions”. In the “Deal Flow” 
section of the magazine contains information on the firms involved in the acquisition, 
the announcement date, the industry they belong to and the acquisition price. The 
daily stock prices for the acquirer companies were retrieved from Yahoo Finance 
Database (finance.yahoo.com, 2013).  
In order to be included in the sample, the companies involved in the mergers and 
acquisitions must satisfy these conditions: 
• Acquirers are public firms from developed countries. 
• Acquirers have stock prices data for at least 250 days prior to the 
announcement date and 10 days after available on the Yahoo Finance 
Database.  
• The targets must be from USA or Emerging Markets.  
 
Sample description 
 
We obtained the preliminary number of completed deals from the monthly magazine 
“Mergers and acquisitions” from 2010 to 2012, taking into consideration not all but 
13 random months between that period. The total deals were 563, but only 195 of 
them have all the information needed for our study. All the information had to comply 
with the following criteria: 
• Have information about the acquirer and buyer headquarters office. 
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• Know the industry’s classification of the target company. 
• The final price of the transaction 
Given that, we could only used 195 observations (35% of all the data collected) 
employed in mergers and acquisitions. Appendix 1 provides a list of all the companies 
used in our sample and indicates if it was a merger between a developed country 
being the acquirer and a developing country being the target, USA being the acquirer 
and a developed country being the target or USA having a domestic deal. 
A description of the sample employed in our study is shown in Table 2 which 
indicated the features of the sample and splits 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the target industry of our three study cases: 
 
Year Number % Number % Number % Number %
2010 8 24% 6 17% 27 21% 41 21%
2011 14 41% 18 51% 65 50% 97 50%
2012 12 35% 11 31% 34 29% 57 29%
Total 34 100% 35 100% 126 100% 195 100%
Cross Border M&A 
Acquirer: Developed, 
Target: Developing
Cross Border M&A 
Acquirer: Developed, 
Target: USA
 Domestic M&A USA Total
Table 2.  Descriptive sample used for the study 
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Others 13 38%
Food and kindered products 6 18%
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 4 12%
Insurance 3 9%
Oil and gas; Petroleum refining 3 9%
Machinery 2 6%
Mining 2 6%
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges 1 3%
Total 34 100%
Others 9 26%
Oil and gas; Petroleum refining 6 17%
Business Services 5 14%
Drugs 4 11%
Machinery 3 9%
Food and kindered products 2 6%
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges 2 6%
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 2 6%
Prepackaged Software 2 6%
Total 35 100%
Others 40 32%
Oil and gas; Petroleum refining 14 11%
Business Services 11 9%
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 9 7%
Health Services 8 6%
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 7 6%
Prepackaged Software 6 5%
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges 5 4%
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 4 3%
Food and kindered products 4 3%
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 4 3%
Metal and Metal Products 4 3%
Telecommunications 4 3%
Insurance 3 2%
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 3 2%
Total 126 100%
Study case total samples 195
%
Domestic M&A Acquirer: USA, Target: USA Number %
Cross Border M&A Acquirer: Developed, Target: 
Developing Number %
Cross Border M&A Acquirer: Developed, Target: 
USA Number
Table 3. Target industry classification of the study sample 
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From Table 3, it can observed that developed countries that make an acquisition in 
developing markets tend to buy in their majority food and kindred products (18%), 
commercial banks (12 %), insurance companies (9%) and oil and gas companies (9%). 
Industries with two or less samples where all grouped in “others” category. Cross-
border M&As when the acquirer was a developed country and the target was USA oil 
and gas (17%) was the most popular industry, followed by business services (17%) 
and drug industry (14%). Among the domestic USA M&As once again oil and gas 
occupies the first place (11%), business services (9%) and Utilities supply being 
electric, gas ad water distribution (9%) are among the most frequent deals. 
 
They all have in common that oil and gas, including petroleum refining is one 
industry where all the countries try to buy the most when they make an M&A 
transaction. Developed countries make more transactions within the energy sector 
than with developing countries. This can be explained because the energy market is 
more liberalized is developed than in developing countries.  According to the 
information, food industry still has a higher niche in emerging markets, and big 
companies are investing on them.  Utilities services (electricity, gas and water 
distribution) is mostly trade in domestic M&As rather than cross-border transactions 
in the USA. 
 
Consistent with other studies, targets that are private represents a greater number than 
public targets in the process of mergers and acquisitions. Shah, S (2013) mention that 
in general more than 70% of the total transactions involve privately held target 
companies.  
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V Methodology 
 
Event Study Methodology 
The event study methodology is used to examine short-term returns behavior around 
the acquisition announcement dates.  Average abnormal returns (AARs) and 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated for different event 
windows around the announcement date. 
 
An event study measures the impact of a specific event, like a takeover announcement, 
on the value of a firm. The rationale behind this kind of studies lies in the supposition 
that, in efficient markets, the effects of an event are immediately reflected in security 
prices. In finance research, event studies are applied in a variety of firm specific 
events, like earnings announcements, M&A announcements, debt and equity issues 
and announcement of macroeconomic variables, among others. (Mackinlay, 1997)  
 
An event study starts by defining the event of interest and identifying an event 
window, which is the period over which the security prices of the companies involved 
in the event will be studied. The event of interest for this study is the announcement 
of an M&A deal. The event window surrounds the announcement day, which is 
designated as day 0.  
 
 
The Event Window 
Mckinlay (1997) states that even if the event being studied is an announcement date, 
it is typical to set the event window length to be larger than one. This facilitates the 
use of abnormal returns in the analysis.  
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In this study, five event windows around the announcement date are used: (-1, +1), (-
2, +2), (-5, +5), (-10, +10) and (-38, +10). The three day event window is suggested 
by Neelam et al. in their M&A event study (Neelam, Yadav, & P.K., 2013). 
According to them, it captures immediate market response to the M&A 
announcement. An 11 day window, (-5, +5) is used by Saens and Sandoval (2005) 
and Brown and Warner (1985). The latter authors also suggest the use of a longer 21 
day event window, (-10, +10) which is supposed to capture any information leakages 
and late responses by the market. A 41 day window is suggested by Neelam, et al 
(2013) in their study of M&A in India (Neelam, Yadav, & P.K., 2013). 
 
 
Abnormal Returns  
To analyze the event’s impact on shareholders returns it is necessary to differentiate 
between normal and abnormal returns. The abnormal return is defined as the ex post 
return of the firm over an event window minus the normal return of the company over 
the same event window. The normal return is the expected return without 
conditioning on the M&A taking place. (Mackinlay, 1997). The abnormal return 
(!!!") is defined by Equation 1 
 
Equation 1 !!!" = !!!" − !(!!"|!!) 
Where !!"= actual return for time period τ.  !(!!"|!!) = normal return for time period τ 
Xτ = conditioning information for time period τ 
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Estimating Normal Returns 
Abnormal returns can only be estimated when comparing actual returns against a 
benchmark. Hence, in order to estimate abnormal returns it is necessary to use a 
model to generate normal returns. There are two common methods to model these 
returns, the constant mean return model and the market model. (Mackinlay, 1997) In 
the former Xτ is defined as a constant, while in the latter Xτ is the market return.  
 
The Mean Adjusted Returns Model assumes that the expected return of a given 
security is constant trough time, and may differ across securities. This model is 
consistent with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). They both share the 
assumption that a security has constant systematic risk and that the efficient frontier is 
stationary. The CAPM also predicts that a security’s expected return is constant. 
(Brown & Warner, Measuring Security Price Performance, 1980). On the other hand, 
The Market Adjusted Returns Model assumes a stable linear relation between the 
market’s return and a given security.  
 
According to Brown and Warner (1980) the mean adjusted returns model performs 
well under a wide variety of conditions. The validity of this model is supported in 
several studies (Saens & Sandoval, 2005), (Brown & Warner, Measuring Security 
Price Performance, 1980), (Brown & Warner, 1985). The authors conclude that the 
mean adjusted returns model provides similar results to those of more complicated 
models which adjust for market wide factors or risk because the variance of abnormal 
returns is not significantly reduced by choosing a more complex model. The mean 
adjusted returns model is used in this study to estimate the normal returns of the 
companies in the sample.  
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The Mean Adjusted Return Model 
 
In order to estimate normal returns it is necessary to define a period of time in which 
the company’s returns are unconditional to the M&A announcement. This period of 
time is known as pre-event window or estimation period and in this study is defined 
as -240 days to -51 days before the announcement date. Similar estimation periods are 
used in other M&A event studies (Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003) (Brown & Warner, 
1985).  
 
Figure 4. Event Window and Estimation Window. 
 
 
 
The daily returns for every company in the sample are estimated for the pre event 
window period. The average of the resulting returns is calculated and denoted as 
“normal return” for each firm. The abnormal returns for each firm are then calculated 
by subtracting the actual daily returns less the normal return as shown in Equation 2.  
 
Equation 2 
! !!" !! = ! !!"!!!!"#!!!!"!  
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Calculating Average Abnormal Returns 
The Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARS) are calculated for each of the five previously defined event windows using 
Equation 1and Equation 2, respectively.  
 
After estimating abnormal returns for the 195 securities, it is necessary to obtain a 
representative single measure of abnormal returns for each day in the event window. 
Hence the average abnormal returns are estimated for the M&A with US targets and 
M&A with Emerging Markets targets separately and for the whole sample. AARs are 
calculated as follows: 
 
Equation 3 
!!"! = ! 1! !!!"!!!!  
Where: 
AARt  = average abnormal return for day t  
N = number of events in the sample  
 
Calculating Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Brown and Warner (1985) assert that it is common to observe leakage of information 
regarding a relevant event, in this case the M&A. This could lead to an increase or 
decrease of acquirer shareholder returns due to the M&A even before its 
announcement.  Furthermore, the market may take some time to fully incorporate the 
news in the acquirer’s stock price after the announcement date. Hence, AARs are a 
poor indicator of the total impact of the information release. A better indicator would 
be the CAARs which are the sum of AARs over a defined event window. (Brown & 
Warner, 1985). Dissa and Perera also state “CAARs captures the total firm specific 
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stock movement for an entire period when the market might be responding to new 
information” (Dissa & Perera, 2010). CAARs are calculated as follows:  
 
Equation 4 
!""!! = ! !!!!!!!!  
 
Where: 
CAART = Cumulative average abnormal return returns to day ‘T’. 
T = Number of days in the event window. 
AARt = average abnormal return for day t. 
 
Significance testing 
Significance tests are procedures used to verify the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis. 
In this study, the null hypothesis is that the abnormal returns at the announcement 
date and the CAARs around the announcement date are zero. Which would mean that 
the announcement of a M&A deal would have no effect on the acquirer returns. In 
order to test the hypothesis that the AARs and the CAARs at the announcement date 
are statistically different from zero, the following t-statistics are calculated: t-statistic 
simple parametric test and the Crude Dependence Adjusted Test (CDA). The null 
hypothesis is rejected when the values obtained from estimations are higher than the 
critical values.   
 
 
T-Statistic Parametric Test 
Significance of AARs and CAARs for the event period is tested using T-statistics.  
The T- Statistic for the null hypothesis that AAR=0 is estimated as follows: 
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Assume; !!!"~(0,!!!) 
Where !!! = Variance of abnormal returns in the event window. 
!! !!! = 1! − 1 !!!" − !!"! !!!!!  
!! !!"! = 1! !!(!!!) 
! !!"! = 1! !!(!!!) 
! !!" = !!"!(!!!!) 
Where 
N= number of events in the sample 
 
The T- Statistic for the null hypothesis that CAAR=0 is estimated as follows: 
Assume; !""!!~(0,!!!) ! !""!! = !!!(!!!!) 
! !""# = !""!!!(!""!!) 
Where 
T= number of days over which average abnormal returns are cumulated.  
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The Crude Dependence Adjusted Test 
 
This parametric test was used by Brown and Warner (1985) in their securities return 
study to analyze the statistical significance of security returns. This tests compensates 
for potential dependence of returns across security events. To do so, Brown and 
Warner (1985) suggested that the standard deviation of average residuals should be 
estimated from the time series sample average abnormal returns from the estimation 
period. This test avoids the problem of cross – sectional correlation of security returns. 
The CDA test statistic for the null hypothesis that AAR=0 is estimated using Equation 
7 the CDA test statistic for the null hypothesis that CAAR=0 is estimated using 
Equation 8.  
 
Equation 5 
!!!"! = (!!"! − !!")!!!"!!!!"# ! − 1  
 
Equation 6 
!!" = !!"!!!"!!!!"#!  
 
Equation 7 !"#! = !!!"!!!!"  
 
Equation 8 !"#! = ! !""#!(!! − !! + 1) 12!!!" 
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VI Empirical results 
 
The results of the tests conducted on the complete sample are presented, along with 
the tests performed for the US targets sample and the Emerging Markets targets 
sample. The increase or decrease in acquirer shareholder returns are measured by the 
CARs in five event windows surrounding the announcement date. Significance t-tests 
and CDA are carried out in order to test the statistical significance of the results.  
 
Statistical Properties of Abnormal Returns 
Table 4 shows some statistical properties of the estimated abnormal returns on the 
pre-event window data (-50 to -250 days before the announcement date). During this 
“clean” period, no abnormal performance is expected.  
 
 
 Table 4. Properties of daily performance measure for individual stocks. For 
each security, parameter estimates are based on the estimation window 
abnormal returns. For each parameter, the table reports the mean of 45,600 
estimates 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows that abnormal returns are highly non-normal. The departure from 
normality is comparable to the reported by Brown and Warner (1985). The mean 
studentized range of abnormal returns is 7.69 compared to a value of 6.85 of a normal 
population of size 200. The man value of kurtosis exceeds the value of the 0.99 
fractile of the studentized range distribution under normality (Saens & Sandoval, 
2005). 
 
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
Studentized 
Range
0.00 0.02245 0.15 5.89 7.69
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Short Term Returns Analysis 
The short term cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for five different event 
windows are shown in Table 5. These abnormal returns were estimated using the 
Mean Adjusted Returns Model for the whole sample of M&A, the M&A with US 
targets sample and the M&A with Emerging Markets Sample.  
 
Table 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Around the M&A 
Announcement Period. For each estimation, the returns of 195 securities over a 
period of -238 days to +10 days around the announcement date are used. The 
mean adjusted returns model is used to estimate normal returns, using an 
estimation period of 198 days from -41 to -238 days before the announcement 
date. Abnormal returns are used to compute cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) for five event windows around the announcement date (-1, +1), 
(-2, +2), (-5, +5), (-10, +10), (-40, +10). Results are shown for the whole sample, 
the M&A deals with US Targets and the M&A deals with Emerging Markets 
Targets. 
 
*** = Significant at the 1% level, ** = Significant at the 5% level, * = Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Event Window
CAARs                        
ALL M&A
CAARs              
M&A with                  
US Targets
CAARs                       
M&A with Emerging 
Market Targets
(-1, +1) -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0025
t-statistic -0.2642 -0.2495 -0.0878
CDA -0.0567 -0.1618 -0.0373
(-2, +2) -0.0057 -0.0056 -0.0063
t-statistic -0.2832 -0.2430 -0.1736
CDA -0.0471 -0.1221 -0.0571
(-5, +5) -0.0115 -0.0098 -0.0206
t-statistic -0.3845 -0.2859 -0.3796
CDA -0.0431 -0.0968 -0.0841
(-10, +10) -0.0279 -0.0218 -0.0591
t-statistic -0.6719 -0.4609 -0.7899
CDA -0.0545 -0.1130 -0.1267
(-40, +10) -0.0455 -0.0357 -0.0960
t-statistic -0.7040 -0.4844 -0.8228
CDA -0.0367 -0.0762 -0.0847
 48 
The results shown in Table 5 are consistent across the three samples, they show 
negative acquirer CAARs for all event window and none of them is statistically 
significant. In the (-1, +1) event window, the acquisitions with US targets seem to 
generate lower CAARs than those with Emerging Market targets. However, for the 
remaining event windows, the M&A deals with US targets show higher CAARs in 
comparison with the M&A deals with Emerging Market targets. The difference 
between CAARs in the samples with US and Emerging Markets targets seems to 
increase as the event windows become larger. Also, CAARs seem to decrease with 
larger event windows in all the samples. The US Targets CAARs are -0.45% for the 
three day event window, they fall to -0.56% for the 5 day event window, and they end 
at -3.57% in the 51 day event window. The Emerging Markets Targets CAARs follow 
a similar, although more negative, path as CAARs go from -0.25% for the three day 
event window to -9.6% in the 51 day event window. Negative CAARs around M&A 
announcement dates and low statistical significance of AARs and CAARs are 
common in other studies. (Neelam, Yadav, & P.K., 2013)  
 
The average abnormal returns for the 21 day event window around the announcement 
date are shown in Table 6. None of these results has shown statistical significance. 
Abnormal returns were -0.08% on the announcement date for the whole sample. For 
the M&A deals with US targets, the AAR on the announcement date is -0.06% and it 
is -0.014% for those deals with Emerging Markets Targets. As Brown and Warner 
(1985) stated, it is hard to draw conclusions and fully analyze the extent of the impact 
of an M&A acquisition by studying only AARs. These results are proof that the 
market takes time to fully incorporate the M&A announcement in the acquirer’s stock 
value.  
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Table 6. Average Abnormal Returns to the Acquirer Shareholders. AARs are 
presented in a 21 day period around the announcement date. Abnormal returns 
were estimated using a Mean Adjusted Returns model with an estimation period 
of 198 days from -41 to -238 days before the announcement date. For each 
estimation, the returns of 195 securities over a period of -238 days to +10 days 
around the announcement date are used. 
 
*** = Significant at the 1% level, ** = Significant at the 5% level, * = Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the CAARs for the whole sample in the 21 day event window. It can 
be observed how CAARs constantly decrease over time in a 21 day period around the 
announcement date. According to these results, on average, M&A announcements 
destroy value for the acquirer shareholders.  
 
 
 
 
Day AAR Tstat CDA AAR Tstat CDA AAR Tstat CDA
10 -0.0028 -0.3084 -0.0573 -0.0013 -0.1306 -0.0734 -0.0102 -0.6264 -0.2302
9 -0.0045 -0.4963 -0.0923 -0.0045 -0.4405 -0.2474 -0.0042 -0.2571 -0.0945
8 0.0012 0.1296 0.0241 0.0018 0.1775 0.0997 -0.0022 -0.1370 -0.0504
7 -0.0018 -0.2041 -0.0380 -0.0007 -0.0641 -0.0360 -0.0080 -0.4878 -0.1792
6 -0.0012 -0.1374 -0.0255 -0.0005 -0.0494 -0.0278 -0.0050 -0.3077 -0.1131
5 -0.0019 -0.2056 -0.0382 -0.0018 -0.1699 -0.0954 -0.0024 -0.1475 -0.0542
4 0.0012 0.1324 0.0246 0.0016 0.1536 0.0863 -0.0008 -0.0490 -0.0180
3 -0.0001 -0.0071 -0.0013 0.0011 0.1057 0.0594 -0.0060 -0.3690 -0.1356
2 -0.0025 -0.2755 -0.0512 -0.0026 -0.2522 -0.1417 -0.0019 -0.1177 -0.0433
1 -0.0032 -0.3557 -0.0661 -0.0048 -0.4612 -0.2591 0.0048 0.2909 0.1069
0 -0.0008 -0.0859 -0.0160 -0.0006 -0.0629 -0.0353 -0.0014 -0.0879 -0.0323
-1 -0.0001 -0.0160 -0.0030 0.0010 0.0921 0.0517 -0.0058 -0.3552 -0.1305
-2 0.0009 0.0999 0.0186 0.0015 0.1408 0.0791 -0.0019 -0.1184 -0.0435
-3 -0.0014 -0.1520 -0.0283 -0.0012 -0.1133 -0.0637 -0.0024 -0.1492 -0.0548
-4 -0.0030 -0.3339 -0.0621 -0.0034 -0.3280 -0.1842 -0.0011 -0.0694 -0.0255
-5 -0.0007 -0.0758 -0.0141 -0.0005 -0.0528 -0.0296 -0.0014 -0.0866 -0.0318
-6 -0.0014 -0.1594 -0.0296 -0.0009 -0.0841 -0.0472 -0.0044 -0.2698 -0.0992
-7 0.0007 0.0820 0.0152 0.0003 0.0280 0.0157 0.0031 0.1886 0.0693
-8 -0.0015 -0.1692 -0.0315 -0.0020 -0.1972 -0.1108 0.0011 0.0659 0.0242
-9 -0.0025 -0.2723 -0.0506 -0.0025 -0.2393 -0.1344 -0.0024 -0.1487 -0.0546
-10 -0.0024 -0.2685 -0.0499 -0.0017 -0.1641 -0.0922 -0.0062 -0.3809 -0.1400
Whole Sample M&A with US Targets M&A with Emerging Markets 
Targets
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Figure 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns: All M&A. cumulative
average abnormal returns for the complete sample from 10 days before the
announcementdate to 10daysafter.
Figure6 showsa clearcomparison of theCAARs betweenthesamplewith US targets
andthesamplewith EmergingMarketstargets.While in bothsamplesthereturnsfor
the acquirershareholdersdecreasearoundthe announcementdate, this decreaseis
steeper for the sample with targets from Emerging Markets. Before the
announcementdate,both samplesbehavesimilarly, however,after the M&A deal is
announcedthe returnsof thedealswith targetsfrom EmergingCountriesdecreaseby
more than double than their counterpart.In the period of 21 days around the
announcementdate, the CAAR for the samplewith EmergingMarkets targetsis -
5.91%while theCAAR for thesamplewith US Targetsis -2.18%.
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Figure 6. Cumulative AverageAbnormal Returns for M&A with USTargets and
M&A with Emerging Markets Targets. CAARs are calculated in a 21 day event
window around the announcementday.
It is alsoimportantto analyzea broadereventwindow in orderto assesstheimpactof
the announcementdatein the acquirerreturns.Figure7 showsthe CAARs from the
day-39 to theday+10.TheCAARs for theM&A with US targetsappearto bestable
up to 16 days before the announcementdate, while the CAARs for M&As with
EmergingMarket targetsstart decreasingsince day -39 or before.A clear negative
reactionfrom the marketsis shownwhena DevelopedCountry firm announcesthe
acquisitionof anEmergingMarketTargetin comparisonwith theacquisitionof a US
Target.
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Figure 7. Cumulative AverageAbnormal Returns for M&A with USTargets and
M&A with Emerging Markets Targets. CAARs are calculated in a 51 day event
window around the announcementday.
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VII Summary and conclusions 
 
The objective of this thesis was to examine the returns to shareholders of developed 
country acquirers when they acquire US targets and Emerging Market targets. A 
sample of 195 M&A deals between 2010 and 2012 was used. The model included 
mergers and acquisitions of both US and Emerging Market targets for the purpose of 
relationship among the reactions of the share prices of buying companies to the 
announcements of each type of merger and acquisition. The investigation is directed 
by emphasizing cumulative abnormal returns to acquirer’s shareholders around the 
acquisitions announcement dates. A mean adjusted returns model is used to estimate 
the normal returns and two different test statistics are carried out to test the statistical 
significance of the results.  
 
The sample used in this thesis is different from other reports because it includes 
recent data (2010 to 2012). Due to today’s global rapid changes, up to date 
information is needed. This sample additionally acknowledges M&A deals with 
Emerging Markets Targets and US Targets to be straightforwardly compared with 
each other, and allows the reader to extend conclusions on the influences of the 
buying announcement on the returns to owners of Developed Countries acquirer firms. 
 
In conclusion, all results show non-statistically significant negative CAARs for the 
whole sample. The average abnormal return on the day of the announcement is -
0.078% for the whole sample, -0.06% for M&A with US targets and -0.14% for 
M&A with emerging market targets, which is insignificant in both financial and 
statistical terms. The M&A deals with Emerging Markets Targets showed lower 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the acquiring organizations involved in the 
acquisition. Using an event window of 11 days, the estimated CAARs for the M&A 
deals with US targets is -0.98%, while the CAARs for the M&A deals with Emerging 
Market targets is -2.06%. In the largest event window (51 days) the CAARs for the 
former sample is estimated to be -3.57% while, for the latter sample, is estimated at -
9.6%. The initial hypothesis that stated that Developed Country acquirers generate 
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higher returns to their shareholders when announcing the acquisition of a US firm 
target than when they announce the acquisition of an Emerging Target company, is 
therefore accepted 
 
Our outcomes indicate that the equity markets respond negatively to the acquisition of 
Emerging Market targets by Developed Countries acquirers. Additionally, cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date, regardless of whether the target 
is from the US or from an Emering Market, also indicate that merger announcements, 
on average, are perceived by stockholders as value destructive. These results are 
consistent with diverse studies. Aybar and Ficci (2009) mention in their study that 
when a company makes a cross-border transaction deal it should expect negative post-
event returns for the stock acquirers. This could be explained by the Hubris and 
Agency Issues hypotheses.  
 
The explanation as to why M&A deals involving Developed Countries acquirers and 
Emerging Market targets generate lower returns than those with US targets poses an 
important empirical question. Current literature explains that Emerging Markets face 
higher political, social and legal risks which can ultimately hurt a company that is not 
used to handling these situations. (Zhu & V, 2012) Furthermore, local Emerging 
Market competitors have a better understanding of the market and the systematic risks 
involved. Also there is more information asymmetry in Emerging Markets and the 
cultural differences between Emerging Markets and Developed countries are more 
accentuated than those between developed countries. (Zaheer, 1995). 
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Appendix 1 
Company list for our study 
 
The information about the companies involved in M&A was retrieved manually from 
ACG’s official monthly magazine “Mergers & Acquisitions”. In the “Deal Flow” 
section of the magazine contains information on the firms involved in the acquisition, 
the announcement date, the industry they belong to and the acquisition price. 
 
Acquirer Country Target Country Date 
Heineken Netherlands FEMSA Cerveza SA de CV Mexico 11-ene-10
Norsk Hydro Norway Companhia de Alumina do Para Brazil 02-may-10
UAL Corp. USA Continental Airlines Inc. USA 03-may-10
Interactive Data Corp. SPV USA Interactive Data Corp. USA 04-may-10
ABB Ltd SWITZERLAND Ventyx Inc. USA 05-may-10
CGI Group Inc. CANADA Stanley Inc. USA 07-may-10
BG Group PLC UK EXCO Resources Inc. - Producing & USA 10-may-10
Regency Energy Partners LP USA Midcontinent Express Pipeline USA 11-may-10
Universal Health Services Inc. USA Psychiatric Solutions Inc. USA 17-may-10
Symantec Corp. USA VeriSign Inc. - Identity Business USA 19-may-10
Johnson Controls Inc. USA Visteon - Interiors, Electn Bus China 21-may-10
Harris Corp. USA CapRock Communications Corp. USA 21-may-10
GS Capital Partners LP USA Michael Foods Inc. USA 21-may-10
Gentiva Health Services Inc. USA Odyssey HealthCare Inc. USA 24-may-10
Equity One Inc. USA Capital & Counties USA Inc. USA 24-may-10
IBM USA Sterling Commerce Inc. USA 24-may-10
UIL Holdings Corp. USA Southern Connecticut Gas USA 25-may-10
Abbott Laboratories USA Piramal Healthcare Ltd India 26-may-10
Royal Dutch Shell PLC NETHERLANDS East Resources Inc. USA 28-may-10
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp Japan Dimension Data Holdings PLC South Africa 15-jul-10
Vedanta Resources PLC UK Cairn India Ltd India 15-ago-10
Sanofi-Aventis SA France BMPSunstone China 28-oct-10
M&T Bank Corp,Buffalo,New York USA Wilmington Trust Corp,DE USA 01-nov-10
McKesson Corp USA US Oncology Inc USA 01-nov-10
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS Turkey 02-nov-10
Amsterdam Acquisition Sub Corp USA Art Technology Group Inc USA 02-nov-10
Eli Lilly & Co USA Avid Radiopharmaceuticals Inc USA 08-nov-10
Amazon.com Inc USA Quidsi Inc USA 08-nov-10
DG Acquisition Corp USA Griffin Industries Inc USA 09-nov-10
Chevron Corp USA Atlas Energy Inc USA 09-nov-10
The Williams Cos Inc USA Bakken Oil Property, ND USA 15-nov-10
Caterpillar Inc USA Bucyrus International Inc USA 15-nov-10
EMC Corp USA Isilon Systems Inc USA 15-nov-10
Allegheny Technologies Inc USA Ladish Co Inc USA 17-nov-10
Cardinal Health Inc USA Kinray Inc USA 18-nov-10
Energy XXI(Bermuda)Ltd USA Exxon Mobil Corp - Certain assets USA 21-nov-10
Medtronic Inc USA Ardian Inc USA 22-nov-10
Humana Inc USA Concentra Inc USA 22-nov-10
Del Monte Foods Co SPV USA Del Monte Foods Co USA 25-nov-10
Rank Group Ltd UK UCI International Inc USA 29-nov-10
ABB Ltd SWITZERLAND Baldor Electric Co USA 30-nov-10
DSW Inc USA Retail Ventures Inc USA 1-Feb-11
Kindred Healthcare Inc USA RehabCare Group Inc USA 2-Feb-11
Corero PLC UK Top Layer Security Inc USA 4-Feb-11
CSR PLC UK Zoran Corp USA 4-Feb-11
Banco Santander SA Spain Bank Zachodni WBK SA Poland 07-feb-11
Enterprise Products Partners USA Duncan Energy Partners LP USA 7-Feb-11
Danaher Corp USA Beckman Coulter Inc USA 7-Feb-11
Deutsche Boerse AG Germany NYSE Euronext Inc USA 9-Feb-11
DaVita Inc USA DSI Renal Inc USA 16-Feb-11
BP Plc UK Reliance Industries Limited India 21-feb-11
Diaego PLC UK Mey Icki Sanayi ve Ticaret AS Turkey 21-feb-11
Host Hotels & Resorts Inc USA Manchester Grand Hyatt USA 21-Feb-11
DISH Network Corp USA DBSD North America Inc USA 22-Feb-11
Gilead Sciences Inc USA Calistoga Pharmaceuticals Inc USA 23-Feb-11
Quest Diagnostics Inc USA Athena Diagnostics Inc USA 28-Feb-11
Norsk Hydro ASA Norway Vale SA-Aluminum Operations Brazil 01-mar-11
BRE Retail Holdings Inc USA Centro Properties Group-US USA 01-mar-11
Total SA France OAO "Novatek" Russia 02-mar-11
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Acquirer Country Target Country Date 
Western Digital Ireland Ltd USA Viviti Technologies Ltd USA 07-mar-11
El Paso Pipeline Partners LP USA Southern Natural Gas Co USA 07-mar-11
Terumo Corp JAPAN CaridianBCT Inc USA 07-mar-11
AIG USA Maiden Lane II-RMBS USA 10-mar-11
Kirby Corp USA K-Sea Transp Partners LP USA 13-mar-11
BP PLC UK Companhia Nacional De Acucar e Alcool Brazil 14-mar-11
Berkshire Hathaway Inc USA Lubrizol Corp USA 14-mar-11
Valeant Pharm Intl Inc CANADA Cephalon Inc USA 19-mar-11
AT&T Inc USA T-Mobile USA Inc USA 20-mar-11
Charles Schwab Corp USA optionsXpress Holdings Inc USA 21-mar-11
CreXus Investment Corp USA Barclays Capital RE Inc-Coml R USA 21-mar-11
Vanguard Natural Resources LLC USA Encore Energy Partners LP USA 25-mar-11
Walter Investment Management USA Green Tree Servicing LLC USA 28-mar-11
Gibraltar Acquisition Corp USA GSI Commerce Inc USA 28-mar-11
Vodafone Group PLC UK Hutchison Essar Ltd India 31-mar-11
Arch Coal Inc USA International Coal Group Inc USA 02-may-11
PPR SA France Volcom Inc USA 02-may-11
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Israel Cephalon Inc USA 02-may-11
ConAgra Foods Inc USA Ralcorp Holdings Inc USA 04-may-11
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners USA KinderHawk Field Services LLC USA 05-may-11
Hertz Global Holdings Inc USA Dollar Thrifty Automotive Grp USA 09-may-11
Apollo Global Management LLC USA CKx Inc USA 10-may-11
Joy Global Inc USA LeTourneau Technologies Inc USA 16-may-11
Publicis Groupe SA FRANCE Rosetta Marketing Group LLC USA 17-may-11
Shire PLC UK Advanced Biohealing Inc USA 17-may-11
Allstate Corp USA Esurance Insurance Services USA 18-may-11
Liberty Media Corp USA Barnes & Noble Inc USA 19-may-11
Morgan Stanley Real Estate USA King of Prussia Mall USA 24-may-11
Cedar Acquisition Sub Inc USA Central Vermont Public Service USA 30-may-11
Energy Transfer Partners LP USA Citrus Corp USA 05-jul-11
National Oilwell Varco Inc USA Ameron International Corp USA 05-jul-11
Precision Castparts Corp USA Primus International Inc USA 10-jul-11
Nestle SA Switzerland Hsu Fu Chi International Ltd China 11-jul-11
Lonza Group Ltd SWIZTERLAND Arch Chemicals Inc USA 11-jul-11
Validus Holdings Ltd USA Transatlantic Holdings Inc USA 12-jul-11
Hyatt Corp USA LodgeWorks-Asset & Hotel USA 14-jul-11
BHP Billiton Ltd AUSTRALIA Petrohawk Energy Corp USA 14-jul-11
Icahn Enterprises LP USA The Clorox Co USA 15-jul-11
Canadian Imperial Bk Commerce CANADA American Century Investements USA 15-jul-11
Ecolab Inc USA Nalco Holding Co USA 20-jul-11
Ensign United States Drilling USA Rowan Drilling Co LLC USA 20-jul-11
Randstad Holding NV NETHERLANDS SFN Group Inc USA 20-jul-11
Express Scripts Inc USA Medco Health Solutions Inc USA 21-jul-11
IHS Inc USA Seismic Micro-Technology Inc USA 26-jul-11
ACI Worldwide Inc USA S1 Corp USA 26-jul-11
First Niagara Bk NA,NY USA HSBC Bk USA NA-Ret Br(195) China 31-jul-11
Windstream Corp USA PAETEC Holding Corp USA 01-ago-11
Carlsberg Denmark Chongqing Brewery China 02-ago-11
Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co GERMANY Liberty Dialysis LLC USA 02-ago-11
Web.com Group Inc USA Network Solutions Inc USA 03-ago-11
Capital One Financial Corp USA HSBC Hldg PLC-US Cc Bus China 10-ago-11
Google Inc USA Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc USA 15-ago-11
Time Warner Cable Inc USA Insight Communications Co Inc USA 15-ago-11
General Dynamics Corp USA Vangent Holding Corp USA 16-ago-11
Noble Energy Inc USA CNX Gas Corp-Marcellus USA 18-ago-11
Berkshire Hathaway Inc USA Bank of America Corp USA 25-ago-11
Senior Housing Properties Tr USA Vi Living-senior living(9) USA 01-sep-11
Toshiba Corp JAPAN Westinghouse Electric Co LLC USA 05-sep-11
Hess Corp USA CONSOL Energy Inc-Utica Shale USA 07-sep-11
PerkinElmer Inc USA Caliper Life Sciences Inc USA 08-sep-11
Hess Corp USA Marquette Exploration LLC USA 08-sep-11
QR Energy LP USA Quantum Resources-Oil,Gas Ppty USA 12-sep-11
United Technologies Corp USA Goodrich Corp USA 21-sep-11
Reed Elsevier PLC UK Accuity Inc USA 26-sep-11
Toyo Seikan Kaisha Ltd JAPAN Stolle Machinery Co LLC USA 29-sep-11
AGCO Corp USA The GSI Group LLC USA 03-oct-11
Superior Energy Services Inc USA Complete Production Svcs Inc USA 10-oct-11
Sonoco Products Co USA Tegrant Corp USA 10-oct-11
NeuStar Inc USA TARGUS Information Corp USA 11-oct-11
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Acquirer Country Target Country Date 
Kinder Morgan Inc USA El Paso Corp USA 16-Oct-11
AmeriGas Partners LP USA Heritage USA 17-oct-11
Statoil ASA NORWAY Brigham Exploration Co USA 17-oct-11
SABMiller PLC UK Anadolu Efes Turkey 19-oct-11
Blackstone Real Estate VII USA Duke Realty-Office Ppty(82) USA 20-oct-11
Citrine Magnolia Corp USA HealthSpring Inc USA 24-oct-11
Plains All American Pipeline USA SemGroup Corp USA 24-oct-11
CubeSmart LP USA Storage Deluxe-Storage(22) USA 24-oct-11
Mitsubishi Corp Japan Anglo American Sur SA Chile 10-nov-11
The Coca-Cola Company USA Aujan Industries Co LLC Saudi Arabia 14-dic-11
Carlsberg Denmark Baltika Russia 20-feb-12
AmerisourceBergen Corp USA World Courier Group Inc USA 06-mar-12
Boston Scientific Corp USA Cameron Health Inc USA 08-mar-12
Simon Property Grp Inc USA The Mills LP-Assets(26) USA 08-mar-12
Asahi Kasei Corp Japan ZOLL Medical Corp USA 12-mar-12
Williams Partners LP USA Caiman Eastern Midstream LLC USA 19-mar-12
Amazon.com Inc USA Kiva Systems Inc USA 19-mar-12
Diaego PLC UK Sichuan Swellfun Co Ltd China 20-mar-12
On Assignment Inc USA Apex Systems Inc USA 20-mar-12
Molson Coors Brewing Co USA Starbev Management Services Czech Republic 03-abr-12
Costco Wholesale Corporation USA Costco de Mexico SA de CV Mexico 14-jun-12
Anheuser-Busch InBev Belgium Grupo Modelo SAB de CV Mexico 29-jun-12
Stanley Black & Decker USA Infastech Co LTD China 23-jul-12
3M Co USA Ceradyne Inc USA 01-oct-12
Ocwen Financial Corp USA Homeward Residential Hldg Inc USA 03-oct-12
Mitsubishi UFJ Lease & Finance Japan JSA International Holdings LP USA 04-oct-12
Amazon.com Inc USA Vulcan Inc-Office Building(11) USA 05-oct-12
UnitedHealth Group Inc USA JPLSPE Empreendimentos e Participacoes SABrazil 08-oct-12
Innospec Inc USA TPC Group Inc USA 08-oct-12
Marathon Petroleum Corp USA BP PLC-Refinery,Texas City,TX USA 08-oct-12
Spectrum Brands Holdings Inc USA Stanley Black Decker-Hardware USA 09-oct-12
Ecolab Inc USA Champion Technologies Inc USA 12-oct-12
Medtronic Inc USA Lifetech scientific corp China 15-oct-12
SoftBank Corp Japan Sprint Nextel Corp USA 15-oct-12
HCP Inc USA Senior Housing Communities USA 16-oct-12
Pearson PLC UK Embanet-Compass Knowledge Grp USA 16-oct-12
ASML Holding NV Netherland Cymer Inc USA 17-oct-12
ACE Limit Switzerland ABA Seguros Mexico 18-oct-12
Pfizer Inc USA NextWave Pharmaceuticals Inc USA 22-oct-12
Halcon Resources Corp USA Petro-Hunt-Oil & Gas Assets USA 22-oct-12
Toyota Industries Corp Japan Cascade Corp USA 22-oct-12
Experian PLC UK SERASA SA Brazil 23-oct-12
McKesson Corp USA PSS World Medical Inc USA 25-oct-12
American Campus Comm Inc USA Kayne-Student Housing USA 25-oct-12
Riverbed Technology Inc USA OPNET Technologies Inc USA 29-oct-12
Clean Harbors Inc USA Safety-Kleen Inc USA 29-oct-12
Walt Disney Co USA Lucasfilm Ltd USA 30-oct-12
PVH Corp USA Warnaco Group Inc USA 31-oct-12
Targa Resources Partners LP USA Saddle Butte Pipeline LLC- USA 01-nov-12
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC UK Schiff Nutrition Intl Inc USA 01-nov-12
Berkshire Hathaway Inc USA Oriental Trading Co Inc USA 02-nov-12
Humana Inc USA Metro Health Networks Inc USA 05-nov-12
Stifel Financial Corp USA KBW Inc USA 05-nov-12
Harbinger Group Inc USA Exco Resources-Conventional USA 05-nov-12
Legacy Reserves Operating LP USA Concho Resources-Oil & Gas USA 07-nov-12
Cisco Systems Inc USA Meraki Inc USA 08-nov-12
Koninklijke DSM NV Netherland Fortitech Inc USA 08-nov-12
Diaego PLC UK United Spirits LTD India 09-nov-12
Apollo Global Management LLC USA McGraw-Hill Education LLC USA 09-nov-12
The Sherwin Williams Company USA Consorcio Comex SA de CV Mexico 12-nov-12
Crescent Point Energy Corp Canada Ute Energy Upstream Hldgs LLC USA 12-nov-12
Starbucks Corp USA Teavana Holdings Inc USA 14-nov-12
Apax Partners Worldwide LLP UK Cole Haan Holdings Inc USA 16-nov-12
Precision Castparts Corp USA Titanium Metals Corp USA 26-nov-12
Priceline.com Inc USA KAYAK Software Corp USA 26-nov-12
Leucadia National Corp USA Jefferies Group Inc USA 27-nov-12
Smith & Nephew PLC UK Healthpoint Ltd USA 28-nov-12
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